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Highlights
• Survey the literature on merger policy in open economies.
• Use a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict.
• Over-/under-enforcement of merger policy can occur, depending on market structure.
• Study the interactions between trade and merger policy.
• Discuss quantitative evidence on conflict between antitrust authorities.
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Abstract
This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. We first
adopt a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict
between national antitrust authorities and on the gains from international merger policy
coordination. Taking trade costs as given, we use standard oligopoly models to derive
conditions on market structure, under which underenforcement or overenforcement of
national merger policies can arise. We then study the interactions between merger
policy and trade policy, and find that trade liberalization often leads to stricter national
merger policies. We conclude by discussing empirical evidence on conflict between
antitrust authorities.
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Merger Policy, Trade Policy, Oligopoly, Interna-
tional Trade
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1 Introduction
In a globalizing world, an increasing share of mergers involves firms selling in multiple coun-
tries. Due to international differences in market structure and consumer preferences, but
also due to the presence of trade costs and to the ownership structure of the merging and
non-merging firms in the industry, any such merger can have different effects in different
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countries. In fact, it may well improve market performance in some countries, and worsen it
in others. This may in turn lead national antitrust authorities to reach opposite conclusions
on that merger.
Over the past twenty years, a number of merger cases have exemplified such conflict be-
tween national antitrust authorities. In 1997, the merger between aircraft manufacturers
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing was cleared by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The EU antitrust authority expressed serious concerns and threatened to block the merger.
A trade war was avoided at the last minute after the merging parties agreed to some reme-
dies. In 2000, the attempted joint acquisition of BOC Group by industrial gas suppliers Air
Liquide and Air Products received approval from the EU, Canada and Australia, but was
subsequently challenged by the FTC. Other prominent examples include the General Electric
/ Honeywell merger, which was cleared by the U.S. Department of Justice and blocked by
the EU Commission in 2001, and the Metlac / Akzo Nobel merger, which was cleared by
several antitrust authorities including the German Bundeskartellamt, but blocked by the UK
Competition Commission in 2012.
More generally, every year, many mergers involve firms that are active in multiple coun-
tries. Figure 1 shows the number of mergers between manufacturing firms where the two
parties had joint sales of at least USD one billion before the merger or takeover. We focus on
such companies because existing research has shown that large manufacturing firms account
for the vast majority of exports in most countries (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott,
2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; Fernandes, Freund, and Pierola, 2016). By doing so, we
significantly understate the volume of mergers involving internationally active firms since
many types of services are increasingly tradable and many smaller manufacturing firms also
export.1 Nevertheless, even when focusing on large manufacturing firms only, our data show
that there are close to 1,000 merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions per year, with a total
sales volume of the merging firms of over USD five trillion. Almost half of these transactions
are accounted for by cross-border M&As and the remainder by mergers between firms from
the same country.
Some of the high-profile merger cases mentioned above have led antitrust practitioners
to propose the creation of a global antitrust authority. For instance, former U.S. Assistant
Attorney General Joel Klein made the following statement: “I have been giving this consider-
able thought and believe that, [. . . ], we should move in the direction of a Global Competition
1For example, Armenter and Koren (2015) report that the average sales of U.S. manufacturing firms that
export is only USD 36.4 million. Given that the U.S. has a lower export propensity than other countries
(Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008), this figure is likely to be even lower elsewhere.
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Figure 1: Number of M&As between Manufacturing Firms with Combined Sales above USD
1 billion
Source: Bureau van Dijk Zephyr, authors’ calculations.
Notes: The figure shows the yearly worldwide numbers of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) between manu-
facturing firms with combined sales of more than USD one billion before the merger or takeover. Domestic
M&As are transactions where the acquirer and the target are from the same country; cross-border M&As
are transactions where the acquirer and target are from different countries.
Initiative, cautiously and on an exploratory basis, but in the end I think such a development
is almost inevitable” (Klein, 2000).
One important question that arises when studying the international aspects of merger
policy is whether national antitrust authorities are able to enforce, and actually do enforce,
competition policy on firms headquartered in foreign countries. Many countries have adopted
the effects doctrine in international competition law, according to which a national antitrust
authority may assert jurisdiction over a merger whenever this merger affects its domestic
market (Griffin, 1999). Indeed, as discussed above, important players such as the FTC and
the EU Commission did use the implied veto rights over foreign mergers. Smaller countries,
on the other hand, are not necessarily able to use such veto rights. Most of the papers
surveyed below focus on the no-veto case, but a few others also consider the veto rights case.
Another important question is which criterion antitrust authorities use when evaluating
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the costs and benefits of a given merger. While the consensus among industrial organization
economists seems to be that the behavior of antitrust authorities can be best approximated
by a consumer surplus standard,2 much of the literature assumes instead that antitrust
authorities aim to maximize aggregate surplus.
This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. In Section 2, we
adopt a reduced-form view on merger policy, which describes a merger as a vector whose
components summarize the impact of this merger on market performance in each country.
We will see that the correlation between the components of this vector has important con-
sequences for the scope for conflict between antitrust authorities, and for the potential gains
from international coordination of merger policies. In Section 3, we take trade policy as given
and use standard oligopoly models to study the correlation between the impact of a merger
at home and abroad. Section 4 studies the interactions between trade policy and competition
policy. Section 5 concludes and discusses empirical evidence.
2 A Reduced-Form Approach to Conflict and Interna-
tional Merger Policy Coordination
Cabral (2003, 2005) and Tay and Willmann (2005) develop a reduced-form approach to
study the international aspects of merger policy. There are two countries, 1 and 2. A merger
opportunity arises in country 1 with probability λ1 and in country 2 with complementary
probability λ2. (For simplicity, there are no cross-border mergers.) The impact of a country-i
merger on the antitrust authority’s objective function in country j, where j may or may not
be equal to i, is a random variable wj. Vector (w1, w2) is jointly drawn from probability
distribution µi.
The virtue of this reduced-form approach is that, a priori, there is no need to worry about
what it is exactly that antitrust authorities maximize. All that matters is the impact of a
domestic or foreign merger on the antitrust authority’s objective function. Here, welfare
can be domestic aggregate surplus, consumer surplus, or a weighted sum of consumer and
producer surplus, or any other market performance measure that antitrust authorities might
be trying to maximize. However, below we take the impact of a merger on world welfare as
being the sum of w1 and w2. For this to be meaningful, we implicitly assume that w1 and w2
are measured in the same monetary units (e.g., consumer surplus or aggregate surplus), and
2For instance, Whinston (2007) writes: “[. . . ] enforcement practice in most countries (including the U.S.
and the EU) is closest to a consumer surplus standard.”
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that, in principle, a country is able to compensate its neighbor for the losses it may suffer.
If countries do not have veto rights over foreign mergers, then a country-i merger goes
through if and only if wi ≥ 0, regardless of the value of wj. Therefore, a country-i merger
that has a small but positive effect on market performance in country i, and a large and
negative effect on market performance in country j would go through.3 This means that
there can sometimes be underenforcement of merger control. Similarly, a country-i merger
that has a small but negative effect on country i and a large and positive effect on country
j will be blocked, i.e., overenforcement is also a possibility.
If, on the other hand, countries do have veto rights, then a merger goes through if and
only if w1 ≥ 0 and w2 ≥ 0. Therefore, a merger that lowers world welfare will never
be approved, and underenforcement is no longer an issue. The overenforcement problem,
however, becomes more severe because if a domestic merger has a small but negative impact
on the foreign country, then it will be blocked, even if it has a large and positive impact on
the domestic country. In other words, the flip side of gaining veto rights is that the neighbor
also gains veto rights. Therefore, the impact on world welfare of granting or removing veto
rights is unclear, and it is easy to construct probability distributions µ1 and µ2 such that the
underenforcement effect or the overenforcement effect dominates.
An interesting case arises when probability distribution µ1 puts little mass on events
where w1 > 0 and w2 < 0, and probability distribution µ2 puts little mass on events where
w2 > 0 and w1 < 0. When this is the case, a domestic merger is unlikely to lead to
underenforcement by the domestic antitrust authority, and veto rights therefore have little
effect on merger outcomes and world welfare. In Section 3, we will see that this situation
can arise under plausible conditions.
Even in the case where countries would benefit little from acquiring (or giving up) veto
rights, there are still gains from coordinating national merger policies, as long as probability
distribution µi puts sufficient mass on events where wi < 0 and wi+wj > 0. Such coordination
could be achieved by creating a supra-national antitrust authority aiming to maximize world
welfare (here: w1 + w2).
Such a supra-national antitrust authority seems to be difficult to implement in practice,
because its decisions would be hard to enforce at the international level. Cabral (2003, 2005)
proposes a solution to the enforcement problem by setting up the problem as a repeated
game. Cabral assumes that countries have veto rights, and that µ1 = µ2. He focuses on
optimal subgame-perfect equilibria in trigger strategies with reversion to the static Nash
3In a Coasian world, country j would be able to offer a monetary compensation to country i to convince
it to block the merger. Such Coasian bargaining over merger policy does not seem to happen in practice.
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equilibrium, where optimality refers to the maximization of the present discounted value of
world welfare.
He finds that there exists a unique pair (w1, w2) such that the optimal trigger-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium is such that a merger is approved if and only if w1 + w2 ≥ 0,
w1 ≥ −w1 and w2 ≥ −w2, where w1, w2 ≥ 0. Put differently, the merger is approved if
it improves world welfare and if it does not harm the welfare of individual countries too
much. Cabral calls wi country i’s concession level: in words, country i is willing to accept
a short-run loss in welfare of up to wi in return for country j not blocking a future efficient
merger where country j stands to lose. These optimal concession levels are pinned down by
the incentive-compatibility constraints, and by maximizing the present discounted value of
world welfare.
3 Merger Policy in Open Economies
We now turn to papers that analyze merger policy in open economies more explicitly. In this
section, we focus on those papers that take trade costs (and trade policy more generally)
as given. The papers in this strand of literature mainly differ along two dimensions. The
first dimension relates to the behavior of antitrust authorities: Antitrust authorities have
a consumer surplus standard in Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz (2015), an aggregate surplus
standard in Barros and Cabral (1994) and Head and Ries (1997), and follow mechanical
rules depending on elasticities and market shares in Neven and Ro¨ller (2000, 2003). The
second dimension relates to the degree of market integration: In Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz
(2015), firms incur iceberg-type trade costs, consumers’ preferences vary across countries,
and markets are segmented, so the degree of market integration is relatively low; in the rest
of the literature, either markets are unsegmented (Neven and Ro¨ller, 2000, 2003), or they
are segmented, but there are no trade costs and consumers’ preferences do not vary across
countries (Barros and Cabral, 1994; Head and Ries, 1997), so markets are relatively well
integrated. We will see that these differences have important implications for the scope for
conflict between antitrust authorities.
We first discuss the determinants of conflict when antitrust authorities have an aggregate
surplus standard and markets are well integrated. In a closed economy framework, Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) argue that if a merger is proposed, then this merger has to be jointly
profitable for the merging parties. Therefore, a sufficient condition for a merger to improve
aggregate surplus is that it does not lower the joint surplus of the non-merging parties (the
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sum of consumer surplus and the profits of non-merging firms). The impact of the merger
on this joint surplus is called the external effect of the merger. In a homogeneous-goods
Cournot framework, Farrell and Shapiro decompose the merger as a sequence of infinitesimal
mergers, where, along the sequence, the aggregate quantity changes progressively from the
pre-merger equilibrium quantity to the post-merger one. This allows them to use calculus to
derive conditions on the market shares of merging and non-merging parties for the merger
to have a non-negative external effect.
Barros and Cabral (1994) extend Farrell and Shapiro’s analysis to an open economy
setting. Suppose first that there is only one market (the domestic market) served by domestic
and foreign firms, and consider a domestic merger that does not create synergies. From the
point of view of the domestic antitrust authority, the external effect of the merger is the
sum of the changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus of the domestic firms that do
not take part in the merger. Note that this does not include the change in foreign producer
surplus. Barros and Cabral find that the external effect of the merger is more likely to be
negative if foreign firms have higher market shares. Intuitively, in the extreme case in which
all domestic firms are merging, the external effect of the merger is equal to the change in
consumer surplus, which is negative, since there are no synergies. In addition, there tends
to be overenforcement of merger policy, because the domestic antitrust authority ignores the
positive impact of the merger on foreign producer surplus.
These results can change drastically in the presence of foreign consumers. Suppose that
there are no trade costs, and that consumers’ preferences are the same in all countries (coun-
tries are still allowed to differ in terms of market size). Under these assumptions, country-i
firms have the same market shares in all countries. Let si be the proportion of total output
accounted for by country-i firms. In general, si is different from di, which denotes the propor-
tion of output consumed by country-i consumers. In addition to the effect discussed above,
Barros and Cabral find that, if di < si (i.e., if country i is a net exporter), then country
i’s antitrust authority tends to be biased towards the production side of the economy. It
may therefore approve a merger whose total external effect (taking into account foreign pro-
ducer and consumer surplus) is negative. Assuming that foreign countries have no veto rights
over domestic mergers, international differences in consumption and production patterns can
therefore also lead to underenforcement of merger policy.
Head and Ries (1997) consider a similar setting, but compute exact aggregate surplus
changes, without resorting to Farrell and Shapiro (1990)’s external effect technique. This
requires to put more structure on the model by imposing specific functional forms for the
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demand function (such as linear or iso-elastic demand). Head and Ries confirm Barros and
Cabral (1994)’s insight that a country is unlikely to approve a merger that lowers world
welfare if this country has a high enough share in world consumption (parameter di).
They then use numerical simulations to argue that, for plausible parameter values, several
countries (the U.S., the EU and Japan) have sufficiently high consumption shares, and that
they would therefore block global welfare-decreasing mergers, provided that they have juris-
diction.4 This leads them to conclude that, since most of the firms that have market power
in international markets are headquartered in one of these countries, a merger that reduces
world welfare is unlikely to be approved. The flip side of this coin is that these countries may
well end up blocking mergers that raise world welfare, i.e., overenforcement may well be a
serious issue.
Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz (2015) study the determinants of conflict between antitrust
authorities in an international Cournot oligopoly model with segmented markets, where an-
titrust authorities have adopted a consumer surplus standard. The impact of a merger
between firms located in country i on consumer surplus in country j (where j may or may
not be equal to i) can be decomposed into a market power effect and an efficiency effect. As
shown by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), this implies the existence of a cutoff marginal cost level
cˆj such that the merger raises consumer surplus in country j if and only if the marginal cost
of the merged entity is less than cˆj.
Since market structures differ across countries, the values of these cutoff marginal cost
levels may well vary from one country to the other. This creates scope for conflict between
antitrust authorities. Suppose for instance that cˆi < cˆj (j 6= i). If the post-merger marginal
cost falls between thresholds cˆi and cˆj, then the merger will be blocked by the domestic
antitrust authority, despite the fact that country-j consumers would benefit from it going
through. When this is the case, merger control in country i is overenforced from the point of
view of country j. If instead cˆi > cˆj, then there is scope for underenforcement by the domestic
antitrust authority: If the merged entity’s post-merger marginal cost falls between cˆj and cˆi,
then the merger is approved in country i even though it harms country-j consumers.
Using the aggregative properties of the Cournot game, Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz show
that the sign of the difference between cˆi and cˆj is pinned down by a sufficient statistic that
does not depend on the merger under consideration. That conflict statistic is defined as
4These results are derived under the assumption that the merger creates no synergies. Synergies make
the country where (some of) the merging parties are located more likely to approve the merger. This can
restore the possibility that a world welfare-decreasing merger is approved.
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follows: ρi = τij
P ∗i
P ∗j
, where τij denotes the (iceberg-type) trade cost from i to j, and P
∗
i (resp.
P ∗j ) denotes the pre-merger equilibrium Cournot price in country i (resp. j). If ρi > 1, then
for any country-i merger, cˆi < cˆj. Therefore, there is scope for overenforcement, but under-
enforcement can never happen. If instead ρi < 1, then there is scope for underenforcement,
but overenforcement can never happen.
Intuitively, if P ∗i is higher than P
∗
j , then the country-i market is less competitive than
the country-j market. Therefore, the market power effect of a country-i merger is more
likely to dominate the efficiency effect in country i than in country j. This leads country i’s
antitrust authority to block too many mergers from the point of view of country-j consumers.
Likewise, if τij is high, then country-i firms tend to have higher market shares at home than
they do abroad. Therefore, these firms have more market power at home than abroad, and
a country-i merger is more likely to harm consumers in country i than in country j.
Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz also investigate the impact of demand- and supply-side
parameters on the value of their conflict statistics. Among other results, they find that ρi is
an increasing function of τij and τji. Therefore, overenforcement is more likely to occur when
trade costs are high.
Instead of assuming that antitrust authorities have a consumer surplus standard or an
aggregate surplus standard, Neven and Ro¨ller (2000, 2003) develop a model in which antitrust
authorities follow mechanical rules, based on a market definition test and a market dominance
test. There are two countries. The authors make two important assumptions. First, all
firms are able to produce and sell in both countries. Second, markets are not segmented
and consumers located in country i can travel to country j to make their purchases there,
although it is costly for them to do so.
The model does not specify how firms compete, how many firms there are, or what kind
of technology firms use. The authors simply assume that, pre-merger, there is an equilibrium
price in country 1, and an equilibrium price in country 2. Let εi be the price elasticity of
demand in country i. Note that, due to the unsegmented markets assumption, this elasticity
also includes the demand coming from country-j consumers who travel to country i to make
a purchase. Neven and Ro¨ller assume that country 1 has less elastic demand: ε1 < ε2. These
elasticities will be useful for the market definition test.
The authors assume that countries have veto rights over foreign mergers. Suppose that
a merger is announced. If country i asserts jurisdiction over this merger (which does not
prevent country j from asserting jurisdiction as well), then this country’s antitrust authority
makes its decisions in two steps.
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The first step is market definition. The antitrust authority uses the SSNIP (Small but
Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price) test. The initial candidate for the relevant
market is the country-i market (which, again, may include consumers traveling from country
j). The antitrust authority asks whether a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to
raise its price by X% in this market, or, equivalently, whether the price elasticity of demand
in country i is less than some threshold K. If εi ≤ K, then the SSNIP test leads the antitrust
authority to define the relevant market as the country-i market. If instead εi > K, then the
antitrust authority needs to widen the relevant market. It therefore includes the country-j
market as well, and stops there.
The second step is an assessment of dominance. Let MSi be the sum of the pre-merger
market shares of the merging parties in country i. Let MSt be the total market share of
the merging parties in the combined two-country market. If the relevant market has been
defined as the country-i market, then the merger is approved if and only if MSi ≤ B, where
parameter B is a market dominance threshold. If it has been defined as the two-country
market, then the merger is approved if and only if MSt ≤ B.
The authors define conflict as a situation in which the antitrust authorities in countries
1 and 2 reach opposite decisions. Since antitrust authorities are not explicitly maximizing
anything, this is a positive view of conflict, which says nothing about the domestic consumer
surplus or aggregate surplus effects of foreign mergers. The authors distinguish three cases.
Suppose first that ε1 > K. Intuitively, this means that markets are quite integrated. If a
hypothetical monopolist were to attempt to raise the price in country 1 without changing the
country-2 price, many country-1 consumers would start traveling to country 2 to purchase the
product. In this case, both countries define the two-country market as the relevant market,
and, since they use the same market dominance test, no conflict can arise. The authors
conclude that conflict is unlikely to arise in global or well-integrated markets.
If instead ε2 < K, then markets are poorly connected. International arbitrage is not too
much of an issue, and a hypothetical monopolist in country i would indeed find it profitable
to raise the country-i price, even if the country-j price were to stay constant. Each antitrust
authority therefore defines its domestic market as the relevant market. The likelihood of
conflict depends on the correlation between the domestic and foreign market shares of the
merging parties. If this correlation is positive, then antitrust authorities are likely to reach
the same decision. Since one would expect market integration to raise this correlation, it is
still the case that better integrated markets tend to experience less conflict.
Last, suppose that ε1 < K < ε2. In this case, the antitrust authority in country 1 defines
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the relevant market as the two-country market, whereas the country-2 antitrust authority
focuses on its own domestic market. As before, if MS1 and MS2 are positively correlated,
then MS1 and MSt are also positively correlated. Therefore, the antitrust authorities are
unlikely to reach conflicting decisions.
What we can take away from this analysis is that, if markets are not segmented and well-
integrated, and if antitrust authorities do follow the types of rules that Neven and Ro¨ller
ascribe to them, then conflict is unlikely to arise.
We close this section by summarizing the main insights from the literature on merger policy
in open economies. When antitrust authorities have a consumer surplus standard, the nature
of the potential conflict between antitrust authorities, i.e., whether there is overenforcement
or underenforcement of merger policy, is strongly influenced by the magnitude of trade costs.
When trade costs are high, domestic firms tend to have little market power abroad, and
merger policy is therefore likely to be overenforced by the domestic antitrust authority. In-
dustry structure and international differences in consumers’ preferences also affect the nature
of conflict. For instance, Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz (2015) find that the domestic antitrust
authority is more likely to overenforce merger policy when domestic demand is less elastic
than foreign demand.
In principle, these determinants of conflict should also matter in the case where antitrust
authorities put some weight not only on consumer surplus but also on firms’ profits, but the
extant literature has not devoted much attention to them. The main determinants of conflict
that have been identified in the case where antitrust authorities have an aggregate surplus
standard are international imbalances in consumption and production. Countries that are net
exporters (resp. net importers) tend to be biased towards the production (resp. consumption)
side of the economy, and are therefore more likely to underenforce (resp. overenforce) merger
policy.
The extent to which firms can segment international markets also has a significant impact
on the scope for conflict in international merger policy.5 Neven and Ro¨ller (2000, 2003)
5There is a long-standing debate in the international trade literature on whether the segmented markets
assumption or the integrated markets assumption best approximates reality. Goldberg and Knetter (1997)
conclude their survey of the empirical literature on exchange rates and pricing-to-market with the following
statement: “There are many interesting subsidiary issues in the study of international pricing, but the
conclusion from this research that ought to affect the way we think is simply this: National markets for
goods are better viewed as segmented than integrated.” With that said, the assumption of perfect market
segmentation may be too extreme, at least for some countries and industries. For instance, the EU has
adopted a regional exhaustion regime, which states that the first sale within the EU territory exhausts the
original manufacturer’s rights to restrict further trade in the common market. This regional exhaustion regime
has given rise to substantial flows of parallel imports in the EU (5.5 billion euros in the sole pharmaceutical
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show that well-integrated markets are less conducive to conflict, because they lead antitrust
authorities to define the relevant market as the world market. It would be interesting to
extend Neven and Ro¨ller (2000)’s analysis to a more standard setup, in which antitrust
authorities maximize an objective function. Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz (2015) take a step
in that direction (see their Footnote 12) under the assumption that antitrust authorities
have a consumer surplus standard. They show that, if perfectly competitive arbitrageurs are
subject to the same trade costs as manufacturers, i.e., if markets are perfectly integrated,
then, either merger policy is overenforced, or there is no scope for conflict. Underenforcement
can never arise. We are not aware of any paper studying the impact of the degree of market
segmentation when antitrust authorities also put some weight on producer surplus.
4 The Interaction between Merger and Trade Policies
We have seen in the previous section that trade costs and, more generally, the degree of
market integration have important effects on the scope for conflict and on the gains from
coordinating international merger policy. This raises the question of the interactions between
merger policy and trade policy. We now turn to a small literature that addresses the following
type of questions: How does trade liberalization affect the design of merger policy? Does
trade liberalization induce countries to use merger policy in a beggar-thy-neighbor way to
promote national interests at the expense of others? Should we expect domestic merger
control to become more lenient after trade liberalization? This literature is closely related,
both in terms of research questions but also in terms of analytical tools, to the literature on
strategic trade policy (see Brander and Spencer (1985) and Brander (1995) for surveys).
In this literature, governments have access to two instruments: Trade policy and merger
policy. Merger policy is modeled in a very stylized way, perhaps more akin to industrial
policy: the government either chooses the number of firms (in Richardson (1999), Horn and
Levinsohn (2001) and Rysman (2001)’s frameworks with symmetric Cournot competitors),
or it chooses how to partition a given set of products into a set of firms (in De Stefano
and Rysman (2010)’s framework with asymmetries and horizontally differentiated products).
Although these papers do not discuss these issues, the fact that the domestic government
cannot affect the number of firms in the foreign country (or the market structure in the foreign
sector in 2012). As expected, such parallel trade has made it more difficult for firms to price discriminate
between EU member states: Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) find that, at the end of the 1990’s, parallel imports
reduced drug prices in Sweden by 12–19%. Nevertheless, price dispersion across EU countries remains quite
high (Kyle, 2011).
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country) means that antitrust authorities do not have jurisdiction over foreign mergers.
Horn and Levinsohn (2001) develop a model with two symmetric countries, homogeneous-
goods Cournot competition, symmetric firms and segmented markets. Government i sets
the number of firms located in country i (merger policy) and export subsidies (trade policy)
so as to maximize aggregate surplus in country i. Importantly, each firm that is allowed to
produce incurs a strictly positive fixed cost. This implies that, in a closed economy setting,
governments would face a tradeoff between enhancing competition and exploiting economies
of scale.
Horn and Levinsohn study several policy regimes. In what they call the pre-GATT regime,
governments choose their merger and trade policies simultaneously and non-cooperatively.6
In the GATT regime, export subsidies are forbidden, but governments do not cooperate on
merger policy. Finally, in the international cooperation regime, subsidies are banned, and
domestic merger policies are delegated to a supra-national antitrust authority maximizing
global welfare.
Under the assumption of linear demands, the authors obtain the following results. First,
there are more firms in the GATT regime than in the pre-GATT regime. Intuitively, in
the pre-GATT regime, governments engage in a subsidy war, in which each government
attempts to grant Stackelberg leadership to its firms by subsidizing exports, as has been
discussed extensively in the strategic trade literature (Brander and Spencer, 1985). In the
GATT regime, export subsidies are no longer allowed so that governments have to resort to
another way of granting Stackelberg leadership to their firms. By increasing the number of
firms located in its country, a government can credibly commit to selling more at home and
abroad, which essentially provides the same benefits as Stackelberg leadership. This suggests
that trade liberalization actually leads to tougher merger policies.7
Second, there are fewer firms in the international cooperation regime than in the GATT
and pre-GATT regimes. The intuition is similar to the one in Barros and Cabral (1994):
Domestic governments do not internalize the positive impact of a more concentrated industry
structure on the profits of foreign firms. Another way of putting this is that the supra-national
antitrust authority ignores profit-stealing motives when setting the number of firms. This
6The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral agreement regulating interna-
tional trade and the predecessor of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The GATT provisions are still in
effect under the WTO and, among other things, prohibit export subsidies and increases in tariffs and trade
barriers over and above agreed bounds.
7Note, however, that Lerner indices increase following trade liberalization, because pro-competitive export
subsidies disappear. This effect dominates the pro-competitive effect of having more firms under the GATT
regime.
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suggests that, whether or not trade is liberalized, there tends to be overenforcement of merger
policy, not underenforcement.8
Richardson (1999) studies a similar model, in which governments set import tariffs (instead
of export subsidies) to maximize a convex combination of aggregate surplus and producer
surplus. Richardson compares the GATT and pre-GATT regimes. (He does not consider
the international cooperation case.) He finds that, when both governments only care about
producer surplus, trade liberalization usually induces countries to adopt a tougher merger
policy, i.e., to choose a higher number of firms. The intuition is similar to the one in Horn
and Levinsohn (2001): under trade liberalization, governments can no longer use import
tariffs to keep foreign firms out of the domestic market. Given the Cournot assumption, they
therefore have incentives to increase the number of firms so as to give Stackelberg leadership
to domestic firms and steal market shares from foreign firms.
The picture is more nuanced when both governments maximize aggregate surplus instead
of producer surplus. The reason is that, in the pre-GATT regime, the import tariff that is
optimally set by the domestic government creates a consumption distortion, which, ceteris
paribus, induces the domestic government to choose a high number of firms. Trade liber-
alization somewhat alleviates this consumption distortion, which weakens the incentives to
choose a high number of firms. If this effect dominates the Stackelberg effect, then trade
liberalization can cause competition policies to become more lenient.9
De Stefano and Rysman (2010) relax the assumptions that products are homogeneous,
firms are symmetric and competition is in quantities. However, to make their approach
tractable, they assume that the firms in both countries under consideration sell only in a
third (consuming) country, which makes consumer surplus considerations irrelevant. Here,
merger policy consists in partitioning an exogenously given set of products into a set of firms.
Trade policy consists in setting a vector of export subsidies (or taxes). Each government
chooses a merger policy first, and then a trade policy. Next, firms compete in prices or in
quantities. The problem is formally equivalent to a vertical relations setting where competing
manufacturers choose their numbers of franchisees, and then an observable two-part tariff for
each franchisee (see, for instance, Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996)).
De Stefano and Rysman compare the GATT and pre-GATT regimes. Consider first the
8Note that, since there are fewer firms and no export subsidies, the international cooperation regime is
the least competitive one, i.e., the one with the highest Lerner index.
9Horn and Levinsohn (2001) also briefly study import tariffs. In their framework, trade liberalization
unambiguously leads to tougher merger policies.
15
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
GATT regime. If firms compete a` la Bertrand, then each country has incentives to assign all
products to a single firm (a “national champion” policy). Such a policy is optimal for two
reasons. First, it fully internalizes competitive externalities between an exporting country’s
products. Second, by strategic complementarity, it raises the prices set by the other country’s
firms. The picture is more nuanced under Cournot competition, for reasons that resemble
the ‘merger paradox’ (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983): The strategic effect of a national
champion policy becomes negative (the other country increases its output). In the special
case where products are homogeneous, Rysman (2001) shows that both governments choose
a fully fragmented industry structure in equilibrium.
Next, consider the pre-GATT regime. De Stefano and Rysman find that, no matter
whether firms compete in prices or in quantities, both countries choose a national champion
policy in equilibrium. This result is proven in two steps. First, by fine-tuning its profile of
export taxes, a country can induce its firms to set any price (or quantity) vector, irrespective
of the merger policy this country chose in stage 1. Second, a more concentrated industry
structure at home induces the foreign country to choose a softer trade policy (higher export
taxes under Bertrand competition, lower export subsidies under Cournot competition), which
benefits the home country.
Putting these results together, the following insights obtain. Under Bertrand competition,
trade liberalization has no impact on equilibrium merger policies, since both governments use
a national champion policy before and after trade liberalization. By contrast, under Cournot
competition, trade liberalization induces governments to adopt tougher merger policies. In
some cases, they might even find it worthwhile to switch from a national champion policy
to a completely fragmented industry structure. These results broadly confirm Horn and
Levinsohn (2001)’s insight that merger policy is tougher in the GATT regime than in the
pre-GATT regime.
We close this section by highlighting some of the shortcomings of this strand of literature.
While the idea of allowing governments to choose directly the number of firms makes the
analysis quite tractable, this modeling approach sidesteps a number of difficulties. First,
it is firms that decide whether to propose a merger, not an antitrust authority. Although
an antitrust authority can block a merger, no antitrust authority can force firms to merge.
Second, in principle, firms should be able to choose between different merger partners. This
choice depends in turn on the (trade and merger) policy imposed by the authority. Nothing
guarantees that the government will be able to induce the right choice of merging partners
by simply fine-tuning its trade and merger policy instruments. Third, this approach does not
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permit to study the actual design of merger policy. In principle, one could imagine that the
government would delegate merger policy decisions to an independent antitrust authority,
and assign a certain objective function to this authority. The question would then be what
choice of objective function ensures that socially desirable mergers are proposed by the firms
and approved by the antitrust authority.
5 Quantitative Evidence and Concluding Remarks
Although the international aspects of merger policy have received substantial interest from
theorists, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on this topic. Breinlich, Nocke, and
Schutz (2015) take their model to the data and, under the assumption that demand is linear
and firms’ productivities are Pareto-distributed, calibrate it to match industry-level data
for 160 manufacturing sectors in the U.S. and Canada. This allows them to compute the
value of their conflict statistics for both countries in each sector. They find that the value of
the Canadian conflict statistic is above unity in all manufacturing sectors. This means that
Canada overenforces merger policy in manufacturing. The picture is more nuanced in the
U.S. While U.S. antitrust authorities overenforce merger policy in the majority of sectors,
there is a significant minority of sectors where they underenforce it.
These results suggest that veto rights matter relatively little in North America, since
underenforcement is only a minor issue there. However, it may still be useful to coordinate
merger policy to solve the overenforcement problem. While Breinlich, Nocke, and Schutz’s
conflict statistic is useful to determine the nature of conflict (underenforcement vs. overen-
forcement), it does not provide information about the magnitude of conflict, and therefore,
about the potential gains from merger policy coordination. To go further, Breinlich, Nocke,
and Schutz calibrate a version of their quantitative model with a merger formation process
to match merger activity data. This allows them to examine the impact of various merger
policy changes, such as giving veto rights, or creating a North-American antitrust authority
maximizing joint consumer surplus. As expected, veto rights only have a minor impact on
North-American consumer surplus. By contrast, the creation of a North-American antitrust
authority solves the overenforcement problem, and leads to an overall gain of around USD
one billion in North-American consumer surplus per year.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no direct evidence that international price effects
of mergers actually vary across countries. One possibility would be to follow a reduced-form
approach, as forcefully advocated in Angrist and Pischke (2010), i.e., to focus on a particular
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merger, and estimate the price effect of this merger at home and abroad. Another more
structural approach would be to apply Nevo (2000)’s merger simulation techniques to an
open economy setting. We believe these to be very interesting avenues for future research.
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